Absurd Time: Understanding Camus’ Quantitative Ethics Through Bergsonian Duration by Ruan, Thomas
“Only through time time is conquered” 
T.S. Eliot 
 
In The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus tries to work through 
what he calls the “one truly serious philosophical problem”: sui-
cide (3). He begins by noting that the human experience is funda-
mentally marked by absurdity, which he defines as the opposi-
tion between the irrational nature of the world and man's innate 
desire to understand it. The absurd is not merely the passive in-
difference and irrationality of the world around us; it arises more 
specifically from our continual failure to make any kind of ade-
quate sense of it. This is why Camus points out that “'It's absurd' 
means 'It's impossible' but also 'It's contradictory'” (29). The sim-
plest way to deal with absurdity, then, is to remove one term 
from the equation by committing suicide. Camus resists this so-
lution, because suicide fails to pay heed to the power that the ab-
surd can give to our lives. By living in absurdity, and accepting 
its fundamental contradiction, we revolt against the temptation 
to shy away from existence– “that revolt gives life its value” (55). 
“Living is keeping the absurd alive,” and it is this affirmation of 
the absurdity of our condition that allows us to live purposive 
and meaningful lives. 
 However Camus then makes a conclusion that seems quite 
troubling. He writes that, “belief in the meaning of life always 
implies a scale of values, a choice, our preferences. Belief in the 
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absurd, according to our definitions, teaches the contrary” (60). 
That is to say, belief in the absurd necessarily cannot ground a 
value, for “the absurd merely confers an equivalence of the con-
sequences of [our] actions” (67). To value something is to deem it 
better, greater, or 'more' than something else. If all the conse-
quences of our actions are equivalent, how, then, can we decide 
what actions we should value? Camus asserts that “what counts 
is not the best living but the most living… Belief in the absurd is 
tantamount to substituting the quantity of experiences for the 
quality” (60-61, italics added). At first glance, Camus appears to 
be advocating a kind of nihilistic hedonism: it doesn't matter 
which experiences one has, since no meaningful difference can 
be made between different kinds of experience – what's really 
important is just to have a lot of them! This surface level interpre-
tation seems well supported by the text, and yet the conclusions 
it draws are contrary to the existentialist project as such, which 
strives to give life a meaning and substance through fidelity to 
the absurd. The way through this apparent contradiction in Ca-
mus's 'ethics of quantity,' I argue, requires further investigation 
into the structure of temporality that The Myth of Sisyphus im-
plies. What does Camus exactly mean by quantity, and how does 
it differ from the commonsense view of quantity? How does one 
engage in “the most living”? In what way does Camus conceive 
of temporality, especially in terms of our experience in/of it? 
 Camus writes that “during every day of an unillustrious life, 
time carries us. But a moment always comes when we have to 
carry it. We live on in the future… yet a day comes when a man 
notices or says that he is thirty. Thus he asserts his youth. But 
simultaneously he situates himself in relation to time. He takes 
his place in it” (13). Here, a clear distinction between being 
“carried by time” and “carrying time” is made. One can either be 
pushed along by the everyday flow of things, or one can assert 
oneself and make the choice to determine one’s own course of 
actions. The major implication of this distinction is that time is 
not some impersonal, objective thing that flows along apart from 
us– it is only in the sense that it is experienced. Furthermore, my 
experience of time changes depending on whether it is me or 
Thomas Ruan 7 
time that is doing the “carrying.” Though this may seem fairly 
obvious, this point is often obscured when time is thought of as a 
purely objective phenomenon. For the most part, we tend to 
think of time in terms of seconds, minutes, and hours, as some-
thing that exists independently from any given subject's experi-
ence of it. This way of thinking about time, which I call 
“everyday temporality,” conceals the phenomenological fact that 
temporality is, at base, a subjective and experiential phenome-
non. Camus's ethics of quantity cannot be understood in terms of 
everyday temporality. Instead, it calls for a richer account of the 
phenomenology of temporality. 
 Henri Bergson's theory of the duration provides a useful way 
for us to do this. At the beginning of his essay, Introduction to 
Metaphysics, Bergson contrasts two ways of knowing an entity: 
“The first implies that we move round the object; the second that 
we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which 
we are placed and on the symbols by which we express our-
selves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies 
on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop 
at the relative; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to 
attain the absolute” (21). 
 Everyday temporality (what Bergson calls “spatialized time”) 
is thus relative: we use certain symbols (second, minute, hour) to 
designate specific periods of time, and all clocks are relatively 
tuned to a central one in London. By describing everyday tempo-
rality as relative, Bergson hints at the disconnect between sym-
bolic representations and actual lived experiences of time. For 
example, what exactly is an hour? 60 minutes, or 3600 seconds. 
This isn't a very satisfying answer, because immediately after-
ward we must ask: But what is a minute, or a second? Going all 
the way back to the atomic definition of a second (yearly agreed 
upon by a committee of French physicists) is not particularly elu-
cidating, either– at the end of the day, to use the words “second,” 
“minute,” or “hour” is to, to use Bergson's words, “move round 
some object.” Yet, this object, time as such, is not an object that is, 
to put it crudely, 'out there in the world.' The relative under-
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standing of time neglects the fundamentally subjective nature of 
time. 
 On the other hand, an absolute understanding of time comes 
out of the experience of being in time. When “I insert myself in 
[an object] by an effort of imagination,” then I gain absolute 
knowledge of it. “What I experience will depend neither on the 
point of view I may take up in regard to the object, since I am 
inside the object itself” (Bergson 21), nor on the way the experi-
ence is translated into symbols, because absolute knowledge is 
not expressed symbolically. Bergson's name for this 'insertion' is 
intuition, and an intuition of time yields what he calls duration, 
or pure time. Since duration is constantly evolving– one moment 
slips into the next with no clear division in between– intuition 
must also adjust with(in) the duration that is being examined. 
“This means that [whereas] analysis operates always on the im-
mobile… intuition places itself in mobility, or, what comes to the 
same thing, in duration” (41). It is impossible to explain a dura-
tion in words, because to do so would fix it in place. A descrip-
tion of a duration cannot at all stand in for a duration itself. 
Again, this may seem plainly obvious, but as Bergson points out 
frequently, we tend to think that accurately formed concepts can 
adequately substitute for the things that they symbolise, which is 
plainly not the case with duration. 
 “Duration is a heterogeneous flux or becoming” (Bergson 12). 
This means that a duration is a heterogeneous multiplicity of un-
equal moments, and that it itself is unstable. Rather than an hour, 
which will always be comprised of sixty minutes, any particular 
duration expands or contracts depending on the intuitive experi-
ence that a self has within it. It is important to note that it is in-
correct to posit a self that is given prior to its experience in dura-
tion, or vice versa– a subject is only in duration, but a duration is 
only as it is unfolded through a self. Duration is a becoming be-
cause it is not static– the durational self is always pushing for-
ward, always moving towards new expressions of being. The 
heterogeneous character of duration implies that intuition of a 
duration can be directed in two directions, either “up” or 
“down”: “In the first we advance to a more and more attenuated 
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duration, the pulsations of which, being more rapid than ours, 
and dividing our simple sensation, dilute its quality into quan-
tity… Advancing in the other direction, we approach a duration 
which strains, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at 
the limit would be… an eternity of life” (48-49). 
 The duration does not have some fixed quantity of time ap-
portioned to it by an external symbolisation– rather, the intuition 
itself of a duration is what gives that duration its quantity. This is 
the first way in which Bergson's theory of temporality contrib-
utes to a radical reinterpretation of Camus's ethics of quantity: 
the quantity of a period of time is determined by an embodied 
experience within it. Camus writes, “Monday Tuesday Wednes-
day Thursday Friday and Saturday according to the same 
rhythm– this path is easily followed most of the time. But one 
day the 'why' arises and everything begins in that weariness 
tinged with amazement” (12-13). What he seems to be getting at 
here is that certain experiences free us from conceiving of time 
solely in terms of everyday temporality– Bergson calls these ex-
periences intuitions. When I have an intuition of time, I realise 
that temporality, as duration, is heterogeneous, that its quantity 
is not at all fixed once and for all. “Above all, freedom means 
awareness of existence and a life of lucidity; quantity without 
awareness is worthless” (Sagi 85). It is this awareness that makes 
the ethics of quantity so powerful, for when I exercise freedom in 
a duration, I take control of our ability to determine the quantity 
of my experiences– this is not to say that I have complete free-
dom when it comes to the quantity of my duration. Since my ex-
perience in the world is absurd, it is not as helpful to talk about 
the quality of a duration; one duration is just as good as another. 
To think of duration in terms of its quantity, however, is to pay 
attention to its capacity for new modes of becoming, new possi-
bilities of being. When Bergson writes that “quantity is always 
quality in a nascent state” (52), he lays out a vital consequence of 
an ethics of durational quantity: the quantity, or experience, of a 
duration is what gives the self that exists within it the freedom to 
become. Camus's ethical injunction, then, is to live each duration 
to the fullest quantity. 
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 Everyday temporality posits an external flow of time that a 
self happens to be placed inside. This implies a particular image 
of time. “We tend to think of time as the connection of homoge-
neous or equivalent units within some already given whole; we 
think of a world in which there is time, or a world that then goes 
through time. We put being before becoming” (Colebrook 41). As 
we have seen, this is not really the way in which time is experi-
enced. Rather than being an extensive connection of well-defined 
units, time actually is an intensive series of durations that are het-
erogeneous, and always becoming. A duration is an 
“inexhaustible source of freedom” (Bergson 13), it is always flux-
ing, flowing, transforming– not every duration is equivalent. The 
French post-modern philosopher Gilles Deleuze emphasises the 
ethical and political aspect of durational time. For him, self and 
duration “are strictly inseparable. Climate, wind, season, hour 
are not of another nature than the things, animals, or people that 
populate them, follow them, sleep and awaken within 
them” (Deleuze and Guattari 263). Again, the line between qual-
ity and quantity is blurred. What matters is not the quality of time 
that is being spent, as it might even be meaningless to make such 
a distinction. Instead, what is important is that the self becomes 
aware of its own possibilities of unfolding within a duration – in 
Camus's words, that the self accepts its absurdity in a meaning-
less world and yet still chooses to exercise freedom. 
“Experiencing the intensive time of speciﬁc durations... fosters 
intuitive awareness of the creative possibilities unique to those 
durations with their speciﬁc convergence of unfolding 
forces” (Lorraine 89). It is through an awareness of absurdity in 
duration that the self can be most free. Each duration contains 
within it many different paths of being that can be taken. Ab-
surdity tells us that there is no qualitative difference between 
these paths– it is by choosing one in the face of absurdity, with an 
awareness of absurdity, that one can live with purpose and 
meaning in intensive time.  
 Rather than thinking of a present time that is static and di-
vorced from our being in it, Deleuze urges us to see that “the 
present as durational whole carries with it virtual tendencies that 
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intensify toward thresholds of actualization in keeping with its 
dynamic unfolding” (Lorraine 9). To be aware of these thresh-
olds of actualization is to be aware of the absurdity of existence, 
to tackle it face on instead of shying away from it. This is what 
Camus means when he claims that, “the absurd man is he who is 
not apart from time” (72). The opposite of being apart from time 
is being within it, unfolding intensively in it, being aware of the 
creative possibilities unique to any given duration. All this must 
be done with the awareness of absurdity. For Camus, the charac-
ter of Don Juan exemplifies the absurd life by passionately living 
in the present. Interestingly enough, Don Juan is an absurd hero 
even though he acts just the same as any other seducer. “He is an 
ordinary seducer. Except for the difference that he is conscious, 
and that is why he is absurd… [He realises] an ethic of quan-
tity… in action” (72). To be ethically in a duration is to affirm its 
absurdity, its infinite capacity for becoming. 
 The purpose of this inquiry was to attempt to understand 
Camus's assertion that “Belief in the absurd is tantamount to 
substituting the quantity of experiences for the quality.” Absurd-
ity dictates that it is pointless to talk about the quality of experi-
ences. All we have left is the experiences themselves, and more 
importantly, the duration within which these experiences unfold. 
In the face of the absurd, one must unfold new possibilities of 
being within their own duration. In other words, we must pur-
sue quantity of experience. To think that quantity is strictly given 
by a certain number of hours, or years, is a mistake. Bergson and 
Deleuze show us that it is our intuitive, intensive experience of 
unfolding within time that gives life its quantity, duration its 
weight. This explains how at the end of The Stranger, Meursault 
can feel “ready to start life all over again,” even though his exe-
cution is imminent. By being acutely aware of the absurdity of 
his unfolding existence, he affirms his freedom, the fact that he 
determines the quantity of his own duration. He does all of this, 
in spite of that fact that he does not have much time left. We do 
not have much time either– our lifetimes, seen in spatialized 
time, are relatively short. However, our duration is as infinite as 
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our experience within it, and it is in there that we must passion-
ately unfold.  
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